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Abstract
We investigate the implications for the setting of interest rates
when monetary policy decisions are taken by a committee, in which
a subset of members may meet prior to the voting in the committee
and therefore has the possibility to reach consensus ex ante to vote
unanimously ex post. We allow for diﬀerent committee sizes, various
voting rules and diﬀerences in skills among committee members. We
find that the size of the committee is much less important in deter-
mining the degree of interest rate inertia than the skills of committee
members. Moreover, prior interaction of a subgroup only has a minor
eﬀect on the setting of interest rates by the committee, provided that
members on average are equally skilled and voting takes place using a
simple majority rule. If either of those assumptions are relaxed, prior
interaction has substantial eﬀects on the setting of interest rates. In
addition, prior interaction increases the optimal size of the Committee,
ceteris paribus.
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1 Introduction
Most textbooks on monetary policy are based, either implicitly or explicitly,
on the assumption that policy decisions are taken by a homogenous entity,
often denoted by ‘the’ central bank. However, in reality these decisions are
the competence of a group of persons, organized in the form of a committee.
Prominent examples include the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
of the Federal Reserve System and the Governing Council of the European
Central Bank (ECB). As noted by, inter alia, Blinder (1998), the fact that
monetary decision-making is conducted by a committee could have implica-
tions for the way policy is conducted. One could, for example, argue that
committees tend to be inertial, as they tend to adopt compromise positions.
In addition, members of monetary policy committees are often chosen to en-
sure a broad representation of society. This setup is often imbedded in a
central bank structure characterized by a main oﬃce in a central location,
with additional regional oﬃces throughout the currency area. The US, where
the Federal Reserve Act requires all of the monetary policy-makers to have
some regional identity (see Meade and Sheets (2002)) again is a good example
of such a ’hub-and-spokes’ system. As a consequence, the FOMC consists of
the members of the Board of Governors (hub) as well as the presidents of the
Federal Reserve Banks (spokes). The Governing Council of the ECB includes
members of the Executive Board of the ECB (’hub’) as well as governors of
all euro area national central banks (’spokes’).
This paper investigates the implications for the setting of interest rates
when decisions are taken by a ‘hub-and-spokes’ committee. Our main contri-
bution to the literature is that we allow for a subset of members (the ’hub’)
to meet prior to the voting. This interaction may modify their behavior
during the actual voting in the committee: they may for example ex ante
decide to take an unanimous stand.1 When considering this issue, we allow
for the possibility that committee members diﬀer in the degree of accuracy
in assessing the state of the economy. This asymmetry may (but need not)
be related to an informational asymmetry. One could think of a situation
in which the center produces, and disseminates only with some time lag,
some statistical information, which is an important input in monetary policy
discussions. The structure of the paper is as follows. After introducing, in
the second section, the setup of our analysis we investigate in section 3 the
accuracy of committee decision making under various voting rules, assum-
ing that there is no systematic skill diﬀerential across members. Section 4
1In reality unanimous voting by a subset of the committee is rather common in mon-
etary policy decision-making, see Gildea (1992). Whether this is the result of ex ante
co-ordination remains to be seen, however.
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then extends this analysis to the case of asymmetric skills. We then turn,
in section 5, to a discussion of the optimal size of the committee. Section 6
concludes.
Our results indicate that the possibility of prior interaction of a subgroup
has a marginal eﬀect on the interest rate set by the committee, provided
members are on average equally skilled and committee decisions are taken
by simple majority. Skill diﬀerentials and/or unanimity voting rule, however,
imply that prior interaction has a substantial eﬀect. Regarding the optimal
size of the Committee, we by and large confirm the classic Condorcet result
for our more complicated setting. In addition, the optimal size of the Com-
mittee is larger when the Board interacts prior to the Committee meeting.
2 The setup
We investigate interest rate decision-making by a committee of n members
which faces uncertainty about the prevailing economic conditions. We model
this uncertainty by assuming that the economy can be in either of two states
of the world: economic conditions may require a change of policy rates (state
A) or not (state B). Each of the states has a certain positive probability of
occurring:
P (A) = Q
P (B) = 1−Q
The decision-making of the Committee is assumed also to be of a bi-
nary nature: the Committee has to decide whether interest rates should be
changed (decision A) or not (decision B). The Committee decides only on
monetary policy, and there is by assumption no intertemporal correlation of
monetary policy outcomes. We also preclude strategic behavior.
Each individual member has a private opinion on the appropriate policy.
The latter is based on private knowledge of current economic conditions (i.e.
economic data becoming available after briefing by their staﬀ, private con-
clusions drawn based on some (possibly common) information, etc.), which
diﬀers in the degree of accuracy. Therefore the probability that an individ-
ual assesses the current state of the world correctly (i.e. the probability of
supporting the change of interest rates in state A and opposing it in state
B) diﬀers among Committee members:
Pi(support A|A) = Pi(support B|B) = qi
Pi(support B|A) = Pi(support A|B) = 1− qi
3
The qi’s represent individual decisional skills of Committee members. We
assume furthermore that they represent independent draws from a single
distribution with E (qi,,i∈N) = q. The latter may be interpreted as assum-
ing that Committee members on average are equally skilled. This may be
due to the fact that expertise often is an important selection criterion for
membership. The Maastricht Treaty, for example, in this respect mentions
”recognized standing and professional experience in monetary or banking
matters” (Article 11).2
Throughout the paper we investigate the eﬀects of interaction among
Committee members on the accuracy of the decisions taken. The accuracy is
measured by comparing the probability that the Committee takes a certain
decision against the benchmark probabilities Q and 1−Q as they represent
the ’correct’ level of monetary policy activism (Q) or inertia (1−Q). As to
the decision rule used by the Committee to take the interest rate decision, we
consider simple majority for the case in which members are equally skilled,
and weighted majority for asymmetric skills. As explained in appendix 2,
these are the optimal rules for both cases, provided certain conditions are
fulfilled, see also Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997). We also consider unanimity,
which is not optimal but is alleged to have empirical relevance.
We allow for various forms of interaction. We start by assuming that m
out of n (exogenously selected) members (the Board) meet prior to voting in
the Committee and exchange views on economic conditions. As a result the
Board may decide to take an unanimous stand regarding the interest rate
proposal formulated in the upcoming Committee meeting. The non-Board
Committee members do not know what the position of the Board during the
Committee vote, which is simultaneous, will be. The alternative consists of
each Board member voting individually. We subsequently extend the scope
of interaction by exploring the eﬀects of an exchange of views among all
Committee members, which may induce some of the non-Board Committee
members to follow the position of the Board. In all cases we assume that
interest rates are kept unchanged if at least k Committee members are against
the change (they support B).
We assume that, depending on the distribution of opinions among Board
members; the meeting of Board members can generate three outcomes: if
there is a majority in the Board in favour of either decision, the Board
adopts the majority view, otherwise Board members will vote individually in
the Committee meeting. Our assumed decision rule for the Board introduces
an endogenous possibility that the Board does not reach any prior decision.3
2For that reason, in what follows we will restrict our attention to results for individual
decisional skills not lower than 0.5.
3Let us assume that m = 6 and kB = 5. If 4 members are for a change in interest rates
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The latter is relevant, as the formal decision on interest rates is taken in the
Committee only. The Board thus has the possibility to decide ’not to decide’.
The corresponding probabilities associated with each outcome: consensus
for a change in interest rates (C(A)), consensus for status quo (C(B)) or
individual decision (I) depend on the likelihood of the state of the world
occurring and decisional skills of the Board members:
P (C(B)) = Q
X
S⊂M
s≥kB
Y
i∈S
(1− qi)
Y
i/∈S
qi + (1−Q)
X
S⊂M
s≥kB
Y
i∈S
qi
Y
i/∈S
(1− qi) (1)
P (C(A)) = Q
X
S⊂M
s≥kB
Y
i∈S
qi
Y
i/∈S
(1− qi) + (1−Q)
X
S⊂M
s≥kB
Y
i∈S
(1− qi)
Y
i/∈S
qi (2)
P (I) = 1− P (C) = 1− P (C(B))− P (C(A)) (3)
where the sums are taken over all subsets S of the set of the Board members
M = {1, 2, 3, ...,m}, such that s (the number of members in S) is at least
kB.
Under the assumption that individual decisional skills of the Board mem-
bers represent independent draws from a single distribution with E (qi,i∈M) =
qB, average (expected) probabilities of the Board taking either of the three
actions are given as:
EP (C(B)) = Q
mX
s=kB
µ
m
s
¶
(1− qB)sqm−sB + (1−Q)
mX
s=kB
µ
m
s
¶
qsB (1− qB)
m−s(4)
EP (C(A)) = Q
mX
s=kB
µ
m
s
¶
(1− qB)m−sqsB + (1−Q)
mX
s=kB
µ
m
s
¶
qm−sB (1− qB)
s(5)
EP (I) = 1−EP (C) = 1− [EP (C(B)) + EP (C(A))] (6)
Figure 1 presents graphically the expected probability that a 6-member
Board assumes a common position in the Committee (i.e. collectively sup-
ports either a proposal to change interest rates or to leave them unchanged)
as a function of average decisional skills of its members for two limiting cases:
the maximum threshold (or unanimity, kB = 6)
4 and the minimum threshold
(kB = 4)
5.
and 2 for status quo, then the Board would not reach a common position. If the opinions
were divided 5 to 1, then the Board would unanimously support the change in interest
rates.
4Thicker line
5Thinner line
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Figure 1: Expected probability that the Board will reach consensus
The Board is more likely to reach consensus if average decisional skills of
its members are higher, since then each Board member is increasingly likely
to assess the state of the economy correctly. The likelihood of achieving
a consensual outcome depends also on the adopted decision rule: it varies
considerably under unanimity rule (i.e. kB = 6) and remains consistently
high under majority rule (i.e. kB = 4).
An alternative would be to assume that the Board always reaches a com-
mon position. In that case the decision rule adopted by the Board is ordinary
simple majority and the probabilities (4)-(6) should be expressed as follows:
gEP (C(B)) = Q 6X
s=4
µ
6
s
¶
(1− q)sq6−s + (1−Q)
6X
s=4
µ
6
s
¶
qs (1− q)6−s(7)
gEP (C(A)) = 1− eP (C(B)) (8)gEP (I) = 0 (9)
It turns out (see appendix 1) that this decision rule is inferior in terms of
quality of decision-making of the Committee when compared to the rule
described above. This is because simple majority leads to a less eﬃcient
use of Board members’ expertise (or information). This finding, combined
with the results of Meade and Sheets (2002) regarding actual FOMC voting
behavior that document existing dissents among members of the Board, in
our view justifies our choice of the Board’s decision rule.
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3 Voting on interest rates without a skill bias
3.1 Individual voting
If the Board does not interact prior to the Committee meeting, the decision-
taking situation represents a standard voting game.6 The probabilities of
passing the decision in favour of status quo (decision B) or in favour of
a change in interest rates (decision A) by the Committee under a simple
majority rule are:
P IND(decision B) = Q
X
S⊂N
s≥n+1
2
Y
i∈S
(1− qi)
Y
i/∈S
qi + (1−Q)
X
S⊂N
s≥n+1
2
Y
i∈S
qi
Y
i/∈S
(1− qi)(10)
P IND(decision A) = 1− P IND(decision B) (11)
where N = {1, 2, 3, ..., n} is the set of all Committee members (i.e. including
the members of the Board).
The expected probabilities of passing either of the two decisions in the
Committee are related to average decisional skills of Committee members,
E(qi,i∈N ) = q:
EP IND(decision B) = Q
nX
s=n+1
2
µ
n
s
¶
(1− q)sqn−s + (1−Q)
nX
s=n+1
2
µ
n
s
¶
qs (1− q)n−s(12)
EP IND(decision A) = 1−EP IND(decision B) (13)
The interpretation of these probabilities is quite intuitive. If the prior prob-
ability indicates that the economic situation more likely does (does not) re-
quire a change in interest rates (i.e. if Q > (<) 0.5), the average probability
of passing a change (decision A) is increasing (decreasing) in the average level
of decisional skills. In other words, the Committee composed of better-skilled
(or better-informed) individuals is more likely to agree on the appropriate
action than the Committee composed of less-skilled members. If both states
of the world are equally likely (Q = 0.5), then the expected probability that
either decision is taken is independent of the Committee size and average
decisional skills and is equal to 50%.
Figures 2 and 3 depict graphically expected probabilities of a change in
interest rates (decision A) for Q = 0.25 and Q = 0.75 for diﬀerent Committee
sizes, i.e. n = {9, 19, 29} .Throughout the paper, thicker lines indicate higher
n.
6See e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997) or Nitzan
and Paroush (1985)
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Figure 2: Expected probability that the Committee will change interest
rates if Q = 0.25 (individual voting)
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Figure 3: Expected probability that the Committee will change interest
rates if Q = 0.75 (individual voting)
We start with an explanation of the asymptotics. As decisional skills ap-
proach perfection (i.e. as q approaches unity), on average every Committee
member is able to assess the economic conditions correctly. Therefore the
expected probability that the Committee will take a certain decision con-
verges to the prior probability that the state of the world requires such an
action. As q approaches 0.5, the decision-making of each member is com-
parable to tossing a coin, therefore both outcomes of Committee meeting
become equally likely.7
Furthermore, the likelihood of a change in interest rates does not vary
substantially with the actual size of the Committee. That is, increasing the
size of the Committee does not necessarily increase the degree of interest
rate inertia or activism substantially. However, for given average decisional
7If q approaches zero, average decisional skills in the Committee would be so low, that
the Committee is increasingly likely to take a decision that is at odds with the state of
the world.
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skills, the speed of convergence to the prior probability increases with the
size of the Committee. In other words, the size of the Committee influences
the relevance of individual decisional skills, in that this influence diminishes
with the Committee size.
3.2 Interdependent voting
We now investigate the eﬀects of prior interaction, first limiting ourselves
to the case of discussion among Board members alone. Under the decision
rule for the Board as represented by (4)-(6) the total probabilities that the
Committee will change interest rates or not are:
P (decision B) = P (decision B|I)P (I) + P (decision B|C(A))P (C(A))
+P (decision B|C(B))P (C(B)) (14)
P (decision A) = 1− P (decision B) (15)
The probabilities P (I), P (C(A)) and P (C(B)) are defined in the previous
section. We need to define the conditional probabilities that the Committee
takes a certain decision in each of the three cases.
If during the Board’s meeting opinions are divided and there is no consen-
sual outcome, members of the Board will vote individually in the Committee,
ex hypothesi expressing the same opinion as voiced in the Board meeting.
Therefore between m − kB + 1 and kB − 1 members will vote for a change
in interest rates and the rest of the Board members will vote against. This
is important for calculating how many non-Board members have to be in
favour of the certain alternative in order to get it passed by simple majority.
In particular, if kB = 4, then Board members will vote individually ex post
only in the case when 3 members are for a change in interest rates and 3 are
against. Therefore the Committee will adopt a change in interest rates if at
least n+1
2
− 3 non-Board members will vote for a change. The reasoning is
quite similar if the Board adopts a common position. Obtaining the majority
for one alternative, in the case of the Board voting against it, requires the
majority of n+1
2
non-Board members to be in favour. If the Board votes in
favour of this alternative, then only n+1
2
−m non-Board members have to be
of the same opinion. Therefore, for m = 6 and kB = 4 we have:
P (decision B|I) = Q
X
S⊂N−M
s≥n+1
2
−3
Y
i∈S
(1− qi)
Y
i/∈S
qi+(1−Q)
X
S⊂N−M
s≥n+1
2
−3
Y
i∈S
qi
Y
i/∈S
(1− qi)
(16)
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P (decision B|C(A)) = Q
(
0 if n ≤ 11P
S⊂N−M
s≥n+1
2
Q
i∈S (1− qi)
Q
i/∈S qi if not
)
+(1−Q)
(
0 if n ≤ 11P
S⊂N−M
s≥n+1
2
Q
i∈S qi
Q
i/∈S (1− qi) if not
)
(17)
P (decision B|C(B)) = Q
(
1 if n ≤ 11P
S⊂N−M
s≥n+1
2
−6
Q
i∈S (1− qi)
Q
i/∈S qi if not
)
+(1−Q)
(
1 if n ≤ 11P
S⊂N−M
s≥n+1
2
−6
Q
i∈S qi
Q
i/∈S (1− qi) if not
)
(18)
We can now compute the total probabilities of a change (decision A) or no
change (decision B) in interest rates. Assuming again that decisional skills
are independently distributed, we can express expected probabilities of either
outcome as a function of average decisional skills of the Board members and
all Committee members:
EP (decision B) = EP (decision B|I)EP (I) + EP (decision B|C(A))EP (C(A))
+EP (decision B|C(B))EP (C(B)) (19)
EP (decision A) = 1−EP (decision B) (20)
where the expected conditional probabilities can be expressed as:
EP (decision B|I) = Q
n−6X
s=n+1
2
−3
µ
n− 6
s
¶
(1− q)sqn−6−s
+(1−Q)
n−6X
s=n+1
2
−3
µ
n− 6
s
¶
qs (1− q)n−6−s (21)
EP (decision B|C(A)) =



0 if n ≤ 11
Q
Pn−6
s=n+1
2
µ
n− 6
s
¶
(1− q)sqn−6−s
+(1−Q)
Pn−6
s=n+1
2
µ
n− 6
s
¶
qs (1− q)n−6−s if not



(22)
EP (decision B|C(B)) =



1 if n ≤ 11
Q
Pn−6
s=n+1
2
−6
µ
n− 6
s
¶
(1− q)sqn−6−s
+(1−Q)
Pn−6
s=n+1
2
−6
µ
n− 6
s
¶
qs (1− q)n−6−s if not



(23)
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Figures 4 and 5 depict graphically the expected likelihood of the Committee
deciding on a change in interest rates, conditional on the Board interacting
(solid lines), as a function of average decisional skills in the Committee,
q. Given the large number of parameters involved, we present expected
probabilities for two priors, Q = {0.25, 0.75}8, and two Committee sizes,
n = {9, 19}, m = 6 and kB = 4. Dotted lines refer to the case in which
the Board has no option to meet prior to the interest rate voting and can be
traced back to figures 2 and 3.
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0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1q
Figure 4: Expected probability that the Committee will change interest
rates (Q = 0.25)
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
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Figure 5: Expected probability that the Committee will change interest
rates (Q = 0.75)
It follows from these graphs that prior interaction of the Board mem-
bers has a minor but consistently negative eﬀect in terms of the quality of
the Committee’s decision-making: assuming a common position implies that
8For Q = 0.5 expected probabilities of taking either decision are equal, i.e. EP (decision
B) = EP (decision A) = 0.5, regardless whether the Board members do or do not decide
ex ante to take an unanimous position ex post.
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some private expertise (information) is ignored, which reduces the accuracy
of the common decision. Further interpretation is similar to the conclusions
presented earlier: Committee’s size does not seem to be very relevant in de-
termining the likelihood of a change in interest rates. The skills of Committee
members are very relevant in this context, as poor skills lead to an increased
likelihood that the Committee takes a wrong decision.
We now extend the scope of interaction within the Committee beyond the
Board members, by assuming that this results in some of the non-Board Com-
mittee members deciding to follow the position of the Board. This obviously
is conditional on the Board reaching consensus. Furthermore, it requires that
the Board’s position is revealed prior to the vote on interest rates.9 More
specifically, the probability that the influenceable Committee member i is in
favour of a certain alternative reads as follows:
ePi(support A) =



1 if the Board supports A
0 if the Board is supports B
Pi(support A) if the Board votes individually


(24)
ePi(support B) =



1 if the Board is supports B
0 if the Board is supports A
Pi(support B) if the Board votes individually


(25)
where the probabilities Pi(support A) and Pi(support B) correspond to in-
dividual decisional skills of member i as defined in section 2.
The dependence in decision-making aﬀects the conditional probabilities
in the cases when the Board has a common position. If we assume that
the number of influenceable Committee members is d, d ∈ D ⊂ (N −M),
expressions (22) and (23) become:
EP (decision B|C(A)) =



0 if n ≤ 11 + 2d
Q
Pn−6−d
s=n+1
2
µ
n− 6− d
s
¶
(1− q)sqn−6−d−s
+(1−Q)
Pn−6−d
s=n+1
2
µ
n− 6− d
s
¶
qs (1− q)n−6−d−s if not



(26)
9We continue to use simple majority as the voting rule of the Committee. Note however,
that this rule is likely not to be optimal when interaction is extended beyond the Board,
even when skills are equal on average. We plan to take up this issue in subsequent research.
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EP (decision B|C(B)) =



1 if n ≤ 11 + 2d
Q
Pn−6−d
s=n+1
2
−6−d
µ
n− 6− d
s
¶
(1− q)sqn−6−d−s
+(1−Q)
Pn−6−d
s=n+1
2
−6−d
µ
n− 6− d
s
¶
qs (1− q)n−6−d−s if not



(27)
As the number of influenceable Committee members d increases, the Board
becomes more and more dominant. Even if the number of the Board members
is small, if d exceeds
¡
n−1
2
− 6
¢
the Board eﬀectively has majority in the
Committee. The eﬀect on the accuracy of Committee decisions is negative:
since each member is more likely to be correct than not (i.e. qi ≥ 0.5),
foregoing the expertise of every single individual is damaging for the collective
outcome.
Figures 6 and 7 depict graphically the expected likelihood that the 19-
member Committee decides to change interest rates in all three cases: no in-
teraction (dotted lines), interaction among Board members only (solid lines)
and interaction in the whole Committee (dashed lines). In the latter case we
assume that 3 non-Board Committee members are susceptible to the argu-
mentation of the Board. The lines depicting the behavior of the Committee
of 9 members are omitted since, as the Board already has the majority in
this Committee, strengthening the Board’s position further has no additional
eﬀects.
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Figure 6: Expected probability that the Committee will change interest
rates (Q = 0.25)
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Figure 7: Expected probability that the Committee will change interest
rates (Q = 0.75)
We conclude that broadening the scope of interaction reduces convergence
of the probability that the Committee takes a certain decision to the true
probability. This result is in line with the literature: ”...the employment of
the optimal decision rule [simple majority in our case], given independent
voting, is superior to using the same rule when decisions are interrelated...”
(Nitzan and Paroush, 1985).
3.3 Unanimity
Our investigation of unanimity (k = n) as the voting rule for the Committee
assumes that the default option is status quo and that interest rates are
changed only if Committee members unanimously vote against the proposal
of keeping rates unchanged. Therefore the probabilities of a change in interest
rates (decision A) read as follows:
P IND(decision A) = Q
Y
i∈N
qi + (1−Q)
Y
i∈N
(1− qi) (28)
if there is no interaction in the Committee and
P (decision A) = Q


X
S⊂M
s≥4
Y
i∈S
qi
Y
i/∈S
(1− qi)


Y
i∈N−M−D
qi
+(1−Q)


X
S⊂M
s≥4
Y
i∈S
(1− qi)
Y
i/∈S
qi


Y
i∈N−M−D
(1− qi)(29)
in the case of interaction (restricting interaction solely to Board members
implies that the set D of influenceable non-Board Committee members is
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empty). The expected probabilities (computed under the assumptions m = 6
and kB = 4) are given as:
EP IND(decision A) = Qqn + (1−Q) (1− q)n (30)
EP (decision A) = Q
Ã
6X
s=4
µ
6
s
¶
qs (1− q)6−s
!
qn−6−d (31)
+(1−Q)
Ã
6X
s=4
µ
6
s
¶
q6−s (1− q)s
!
(1− q)n−6−d(32)
Figures 8, 9 and 10 present expected probabilities of a change in interest
rates under an unanimous voting rule for two Committee sizes: n = {9, 19}
and three priors: Q = {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}. As before, the dotted line refers to
the case of no interaction, solid lines to the case when the Board interacts
and dashed lines to interaction among all Committee members. Again we
assume that 3 non-Board Committee members follow the position of the
Board. In the case of the smaller Committee this implies that the Board
is able to convince all other Committee members of its position, so that
the probability that the Committee will change interest rates is equal to
the probability that the Board will reach consensus in favour of the change:
EP (decision A) = EP (C(A)).
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Figure 8: Expected probability of interest rate change under unanimity
(Q = 0.25)
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Figure 9: Expected probability of interest rate change under unanimity
(Q = 0.5)
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Figure 10: Expected probability of interest rate change under unanimity
(Q = 0.75)
The figures corroborate the largely qualitative statements made by Blin-
der (1998), as quoted in the introduction. If the Committee has preference
for unanimous decision-making, the degree of monetary policy activism will
be close to zero (especially if the Committee is relatively large). The proba-
bility of changing interest rates converges to the true probability Q only for
high levels of decisional skills q. Interaction increases the probability that
interest rates will be changed. This is because it ’softens’ the rigidity in-
herent in the unanimous voting rule, i.e. the requirement that all members
must be of the same opinion. If the Board is allowed to decide on its com-
mon position, the actual number of Committee members which have to be
in favour of a change in interest rates is n−m+ kB and not n (since m− kB
members of the Board will vote for a change against their private opinion). If
the Board is allowed to share its views with other Committee members and
is able to convince some of them, the number of extra Committee members
which have to be in favour of a change in interest rates is further reduced
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to n −m− d + kB. The impact of interaction is larger, ceteris paribus, for:
(1) smaller Committees, (2) larger number of influenceable Committee mem-
bers. Interestingly enough, if the Board is able to convince all Committee
members of its position, the degree of Committee’s activism can even exceed
the true probability Q.
4 Implications of a systematic skill diﬀeren-
tial
In this section we will make our structure more complex by assuming that
the decisional skills of Board members are on average higher than those of
(non-Board) Committee members, i.e. qB > qNB. This systematic skill
diﬀerential between the ’hub’ and the ’spokes’ may for example be due to an
informational advantage.10 The optimal decision rule in this case would be
weighted majority, with higher weights assigned to better-skilled individuals
(see Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997), see also appendix 2). However, in order
to allow a comparison with the previous section we start with simple majority.
The latter also turns out to be a reasonable approximation of the optimal
rule, especially when the Committee is relatively small and/or decisional
skills are high (see appendix 2).
4.1 Simple majority
Figures 11 and 12 represent expected probabilities of an interest rate change
for qB = 0.8 as a function of average decisional skills of the non-Board
members of the Committee, qNB (Q = {0.25, 0.75}11, n = {9, 19} , m = 6,
kB = 4). The key to the lines remains unchanged.
12
10Assuming qNB > qB would reverse the results.
11When the prior is neutral, i.e. Q = 0.5, the likelihood of a change in interest rates is
fixed at 50%.
12I.e. dotted lines correspond to the no-interaction case, solid lines to interaction limited
to Board members and dashed lines to interaction in the whole Committee.
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Figure 11: Expected probability that the Committee will change interest
rates if Q = 0.25 (qNB < qB = 0.8)
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Figure 12: Expected probability that the Committee will change interest
rates if Q = 0.75 (qNB < qB = 0.8)
The fact that Board members are (on average) more accurate in their
decisions modifies the conclusions from the previous section. Whereas we
concluded in the latter that the possibility of the Board reaching consensus
a priori did not have a major influence, we now see that allowing prior in-
teraction among Board members may improve the accuracy of the decision
making process (although if the skills of the non-Board members exceed a
certain threshold individual voting is superior):
- if the Committee is small, such that the Board has a majority in the
Committee, the expected probability of a change in interest rates diﬀers
by at most 3 percentage points from the true probability Q in the case of
interaction, compared to 5 percentage points if interaction is precluded
- in a large Committee, this eﬀect is even more profound: the diﬀerence
is reduced from 10 to 3 percentage points (if interaction is extended to the
whole Committee).13
13If the asymmetry in skills was opposite, i.e. if Board members were relatively less
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4.2 Weighted voting
An alternative voting rule for decision making in the Committee is based on
a weighting of votes of individual members according to individual exper-
tise. Throughout this subsection we will use optimal weights as explained in
appendix 2 (in particular, equations (49) and (50)).
Figures 13 and 14 correspond to figures in the previous subsection and
present expected probabilities that the 19-member Committee decides to
change interest rates if the votes are weighted.
0.255
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0.265
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0.275
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75q(NB)
Figure 13: Expected probability that the Committee will change interest
rates if the votes are weighted (Q = 0.25)
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Figure 14: Expected probability that the Committee will change interest
rates if the votes are weighted (Q = 0.75)
As in the case of simple majority voting under symmetric skills, allow-
ing for interaction among the members of the Committee in the case when
skilled, the conclusions should be reversed: prior interaction of Board members would
reduce the accuracy of the decisions of the Committee. However, this eﬀect becomes less
relevant the larger the Committee (provided it is dominated by the non-Board members).
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their skills are asymmetric and therefore their votes are weighted reduces
the accuracy of the decisions (although assigning the optimal weights to
the votes improves the accuracy). Therefore we can again conclude that, if
the optimal decision rule is implemented, interaction can only hamper the
decision-making process. However, if the decision rule is not optimal (e.g. if
the decisional skills are asymmetric but the votes are not weighted), allowing
for interaction can be beneficial, especially if interaction is allowed among
more skilled individuals (the Board in our case). Interaction reinforces the
position of the Board and may eﬀectively replace the optimal voting rule.
4.3 Unanimity
We now consider the expected probability that the Committee will change
interest rates in the case when the decision has to be taken by unanimity.
The expected probabilities that the Committee will adopt a change in cases
when interaction is allowed and not are given as follows:
EP (decision A) = Q
Ã
6X
s=4
µ
6
s
¶
qsB (1− qB)
6−s
!
qn−6−dNB
+(1−Q)
Ã
6X
s=4
µ
6
s
¶
q6−sB (1− qB)
s
!
(1− qNB)n−6−d(33)
EP IND(decision A) = Qq6Bq
n−6
NB + (1−Q) (1− qB)
6 (1− qNB)n−6 (34)
In this case, we reverse the earlier findings that asymmetric skills are neces-
sary to generate substantial eﬀects of prior interaction on Committee deci-
sion making, when we assumed that decisions are taken by simple majority.
Below we present figures 15, 16 and 17 depicting expected probabilities of a
change in interest rates in the case of asymmetric skills (qB = 0.8, qNB < 0.8,
n = {9, 29}), analogous to figures 8, 9 and 10 in section 3.3. The correspond-
ing lines drawn for the same prior are quite similar, therefore we conclude
that any reduction in interest rate inertia under unanimous voting rule is
mainly due to interaction and not asymmetric skills.14
14The eﬀects of assuming that Board members are relatively less skilled than other
members of the Committee are qualitatively the same.
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Figure 15: Expected probability of interest rate change under unanimity
(Q = 0.25, qNB < qB)
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Figure 16: Expected probability of interest rate change under unanimity
(Q = 0.5, qNB < qB)
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Figure 17: Expected probability of interest rate change under unanimity
(Q = 0.75, qNB < qB)
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5 Optimal size of the Committee
We now turn to an analysis of the optimal size of the Committee, that is the
size which maximizes the accuracy of its decisions (taken by simple major-
ity), which we define as the sum of conditional expected probabilities that
the Committee takes the right decision: EP (decision A|A) and EP (decision
B|B):
Π = EP (decision A|A) + EP (decision B|B) (35)
Throughout this section we also allow for delegation of decision making to
the Board. In the latter case we will assume that the decision is taken by
simple majority (see formulas (7)-(8) in section 2).
When members vote individually and average decisional skills are homo-
geneous, the classic Condorcet Jury Theorem holds: provided that q ≥ 0.5
and that there are no costs involved in adding Committee members, in-
creasing the size of the Committee reduces the probability that an incorrect
decision is taken. Therefore the Committee should be as large as possible:
the optimum size is unbounded. As illustrated by figure 18, we retain the
Condorcet result in a setting with interaction among members of the Board
and when skills are homogeneous. The graph depicts values of function Π for
three Committee sizes: n = m = 6, n = 19 and n = maximum15. It follows
that, for q ≥ 0.5, the accuracy of Committee’s decisions increases with its
size.16 Extending interaction to the whole Committee does not aﬀect this
conclusion.
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Figure 18: The accuracy of the Committee’s decisions in the case of
interaction (homogeneous skills)
If we introduce asymmetric skills, the Condorcet result remains basically
valid: if qNB is below 0.5, it is optimal to delegate decision-making to the
15In the figures the maximum is set at 29, for presentational purposes.
16Note that, as the criterion function is bounded, it cannot exceed the value of 2.
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Board; if qNB is large, the optimal size of the Committee is unbounded
(see figures 1917 and figure 2018). However, the unboundedness of the op-
timum requires higher skill levels than in the previous case. Interestingly
enough, there exists a third regime for intermediate decisional skills. In that
regime the optimally-sized Committee should include a certain number of
non-Board members but such that the Board retains majority. The exis-
tence of this third regime follows from the interplay between the Condorcet
result and the eﬀects of superior skills (and interaction) of Board members.19
Extending interaction within the Committee beyond the Board does not alter
the qualitative results; however, since it has positive eﬀects on the decision-
making (see figures (11) and (12)), the range of skills in which the third
regime applies becomes more limited.
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8q(NB)
Figure 19: The accuracy of the Committee’s decisions in the case of
interaction (asymmetric skills)
17The thin line is drawn for n = m = 6, the medium line for n = 11 and the thick line
for n = 29.
18The thin line corresponds to n = m = 6, the medium line to n = 7 and the thick line
to n = 29.
19If we alternatively assume that non-Board members of the Committee have superior
skills, then for any level of average skills among Board members, 0 < qB < qNB, it would
be optimal to have as many non-Board members as possible, i.e. an unboundedly large
Committee.
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Figure 20: The accuracy of the Committee’s decisions in the case of no
interaction (asymmetric skills)
Investigating the case in which the Committee decides by weighted voting
(i.e. the optimal rule) explains the origins of the intermediate regime: it arises
as a result of an ineﬃcient decision rule. If the rule is optimal, the Condorcet
result holds without exceptions (see figure 2120).
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Figure 21: The accuracy of the Committee’s decisions if the votes are
weighted
When a certain skill level is exceeded, the optimal Committee size is un-
bounded. In this case, we need to introduce a cost of adding extra members.
We will follow the literature (Gradstein et al. (1990)) and assume that the
cost of having a Committee of n members is linearly increasing in n (i.e. the
marginal cost of adding one extra member is constant21):
C(n) = cn
MC = c
20The thin line is drawn for n = m = 6, the medium line for n = 19 and the thick line
for n = 29. Dotted lines depict the no-interaction case, solid lines the case when Board
members interact.
21A real life example of such a cost is the salary paid to each Committe member.
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The table below presents optimal Committee sizes as a function of deci-
sional skills of the members (for now assumed to be identical on average)
and marginal cost. In general, the lower the marginal cost of adding mem-
bers, the larger the optimal size: if adding extra members is (almost) free,
the optimal size of the Committee is unbounded, i.e. the Condorcet result.
If on the other hand adding members is very costly, the optimal size will ap-
proach the minimum of one member.22 For a given marginal cost the optimal
size decreases as the skill level increases. This is because the marginal con-
tribution of an additional member to the accuracy of Committees composed
of highly skilled individuals is lower in comparison to Committees with less
skilled members.
Furthermore, the optimal Committee size diﬀers between individual vot-
ing and interaction. For low marginal cost the optimal size of Committees in
which interaction is allowed should go beyond that of Committees without
interaction, ceteris paribus. This is because prior interaction results in a loss
of private information if the Board assumes a common position (the infor-
mation of the Board minority and those non-Board members, who follow the
position of the Board), and extra non-Board members need to be added to
provide additional expertise necessary to correct for this loss.
Individual voting Interaction Extended interaction
MC/q 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.001 > 50 37 19 > 50 43 23 > 50 > 50 33
0.002 > 50 31 15 > 50 37 19 > 50 45 13
0.003 > 50 27 13 > 50 31 17 > 50 41 13
0.004 > 50 23 13 > 50 29 15 > 50 37 13
0.005 43 21 11 49 27 13 > 50 33 13
0.006 37 21 11 43 25 13 > 50 31 13
0.007 33 19 11 37 23 13 43 13 13
0.008 29 17 < 11 33 21 13 37 13 13
0.009 27 17 < 11 31 19 13 13 13 13
0.010 23 15 < 11 27 19 13 13 13 13
0.011 21 15 < 11 23 17 13 13 13 13
0.012 19 15 < 11 21 15 13 13 13 13
0.013 17 13 < 11 13 13 13 13 13 13
0.014 17 13 < 11 13 13 13 13 13 13
0.015 15 13 < 11 13 13 13 13 13 13
≥ 0.016 ≤ 13 ≤ 11 < 11 13 13 13 13 13 13
22Note that, for the case of interaction, we preclude a Board-dominated Committee,
and therefore the smallest possible size is 13. This restriction does not apply to the case
of individual voting.
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If we allow for asymmetric skills23, the optimal size of the Committee is re-
duced, ceteris paribus. Except for very low skills of the non-Board members,
the results are similar to the case of symmetric skills: if marginal cost is
low, the optimum for the Committees allowing for interaction is larger than
Committees which ban interaction. If the average level of skills among the
non-Board members is very low, the Committees allowing for interaction are
smaller.
Individual voting Interaction Extended interaction
MC/qNB 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.65 0.7 0.75
0.001 > 50 29 23 37 31 25 41 37 33
0.002 29 23 19 23 23 21 15 25 27
0.003 < 11 19 15 13 19 19 13 13 13
0.004 < 11 15 13 13 13 15 13 13 13
0.005 < 11 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
≥ 0.006 < 11 < 11 ≤ 11 13 13 13 13 13 13
However, the general conclusion remains, that for the same marginal cost
and skill levels, Committees should be larger if interaction is a part of the
decision-making process. This result stems from ineﬃciencies inherent to
interaction.
6 Conclusions
Our results have interesting implications for actual monetary policy making,
when conducted in a committee. First of all, although decision-making by
a committee is often associated with inertia, our analysis shows that this is
by no means necessary. In fact, the size of the committee is far less impor-
tant than the skills of its members in determining inertia (under a simple
majority voting rule). Indeed, larger committees may be beneficial in that
the accuracy of monetary policy decisions (measured as the convergence of
the probability of the actual interest rate decision to the theoretical best
decision) is increasing in committee size. Second, our finding that the skills
of committee members are crucial in determining the quality of monetary
policy decision making stresses the importance of professional reputation in
monetary policy matters as selection criterion for committee membership.
Given the political dimension that often surrounds appointments to mone-
tary policy committees, this point is worth emphasizing. Third, decisional
skills of committee members are defined as the ability to identify correctly
23However, we assume that the members’ votes are not weighted.
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the monetary policy stance that is appropriate given the prevailing economic
situation. This definition illustrates that the quality of the staﬀ support-
ing each committee member, and of the information they base their advice
on, will be instrumental in ensuring high skills of all individual committee
members, both from the ’hub’ and from the ’spokes’. Fourth, under a simple
majority voting rule, equal level of skills between the ’hub’ and the ’spokes’
ensures that prior interaction does not materially aﬀect the interest rate set-
ting in the committee. Conversely, when the committee decides on interest
rates by consensus, prior interaction will improve the outcome, even if skills
are equal. Finally, the US FOMC and the ECB Governing Council diﬀer
regarding in the degree of centralization: in the FOMC, the ’hub’ has the
majority in the committee, in the ECB Governing Council the majority lies
with the ’spokes’. Our results show that FOMC structure is superior in terms
of quality of decision-making if decisional skills are asymmetric and the ’hub’
has a relatively large advantage. The ECB structure, on the other hand, is
superior when skills of decision-makers are relatively similar.
We would like to conclude by stating that, while the main motivation of
this research is based on real life, i.e. the ’hub-and-spokes’ monetary policy
committees of the US Federal Reserve and the ECB, our analysis is highly
stylized and contains some important caveats. This should be kept in mind
when interpreting our results. An example of such a caveat is that our setup
allows only for a limited and specific form of interaction among members, re-
ducing the scope for an exchange of arguments that would lead to a change of
position. As noted by others, see, for example, DNB (2000) and Goodfriend
(1999), this interaction, where a common vision on interest rates evolves from
an exchange of views based on economic analysis, is an important character-
istic of monetary policy decision making by real-life committees such as the
ECB Governing Council or the FOMC of the Federal Reserve. Our results
on interaction imply that it in general reduces the quality of collective deci-
sion making, which corroborates the findings of Nitzan and Paroush (1985).
However, other studies that allow for interaction among committee members
(for example Swank and Wrasai (2002)) find that a debate in the committee
can be beneficial. We therefore conclude that further research is warranted
on this topic. Moreover, in our simple setup the only value added the board
can provide is in terms of improving the quality of decision-making in the
committee. This is clearly a simplification of reality, where - as mentioned
in the introduction - ’hub-and-spokes’ committees tend to be motivated by
other arguments. Other important caveats include the static nature of our
analysis, which clearly is at odds with the fact that monetary policy deci-
sions are taken on a regular basis, so that the intertemporal dimension may
be relevant for the current setting of interest rates. We plan to take up the
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latter issue in future research.
7 Appendix 1: Position of the Board
By Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, there is no consistent rule, majority vot-
ing or otherwise, for constructing social preferences from arbitrary individual
preferences when individuals have to choose between more than two alterna-
tives. Therefore there does not exist an optimal decision rule in such a case
as ours - the choice between decision A, decision B or no decision. Neverthe-
less, we can still compare diﬀerent decision rules in terms of their accuracy.
This appendix compares the performance of our assumed voting rule for the
Board (formalized in (4)-(6)) with simple majority (formulas (7)-(9)). Our
criterion is the degree of accuracy in the decisions of the whole Committee,
defined as the sum of conditional expected probabilities that the Committee
takes the right decision: EP (decision A|A) and EP (decision B|B).
Π = P (decision A|A) + P (decision B|B) (36)
Let us proceed in two cases: the case when the Board has the majority in
the Committee and the case when it does not.24
Case 1: The Board has the majority in the Committee (n ≤ 11)
In this case the Committee’s decisions are driven by the Board. Therefore
the criterion function for the simple majority decision rule is given as follows:
Π(SM) = 1−
6X
s=4
µ
6
s
¶
(1− q)sq6−s +
6X
s=4
µ
6
s
¶
(1− q)6−sqs (37)
whereas for our decision rule, the ’modified majority’, which allows for an
ex-post individual voting, it is:
Π(MM) = 1−
6X
s=4
µ
6
s
¶
(1− q)sq6−s +
6X
s=4
µ
6
s
¶
qs (1− q)6−s
+
µ
6
3
¶
(1− q)3q3


n−6X
s=n+1
2
−3
µ
n− 6
s
¶¡
qs (1− q)n−6−s − (1− q)sqn−6−s
¢(38)
In figure 1A we present values of the criterion function Π for the simple
majority rule (the dotted line) and our decision rule (the solid line) for n = 9,
m = 6 and kB = 4.
24For the sake of simplicity we assume identical decisional skills for all Committee mem-
bers, qB = qNB = q ≥ 0.5.
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Figure 1A: The criterion function Π = P (decision A|A) + P (decision B|B)
It is clear that our decision rule yields superior results for high decisional
skills of Committee members (q ≥ 0.5). Let us now turn to a more compli-
cated case of a large Committee.
Case 2: The Board is in minority (i.e. n > 11)
In this case the position of the non-Board members matters for the final
decision. The criterion function for the simple majority decision rule is given
as:
Π(SM) = 1− [
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whereas for the decision rule we suggest it is:
Π (MM) = 1− [
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In figure 2A we again present the criterion function. We set n = 29.
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Figure 2A: The criterion function Π = P (decision A|A) + P (decision B|B)
Although the diﬀerence is much smaller now and is restricted to inter-
mediate skill levels, our decision rule still performs better than the ordinary
simple majority. We therefore claim, that the Board should be in favour of
the decision rule we suggest versus ordinary simple majority.
8 Appendix 2: Voting rules
We mainly use either a simple majority rule or the unanimity principle when
the Committee decides on interest rates. The motivation for these rules is
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mainly their real-life applicability. The FOMC for example uses a simple
majority rule, whereas the Governing Council of the ECB - although de jure
also supposed to use a simple majority rule - de facto sets interest rates based
on the principle of consensus.25 In this appendix, we broaden the perspective
by turning to a rule that is optimal in the sense that it maximizes the degree
of accuracy of the collective decision-making process.
Interaction between Board members in our setup has no influence on an
ex ante defined optimal voting rule, as (1) the non-Board members are not
aware of the outcome of the Board’s meeting, (2) the Committee vote on
interest rates is simultaneous and finally (3) there is no scope for strategic
considerations. As a result, the optimal rule derived by Ben-Yashar and
Nitzan (1997) applies, both for individual voting and for interaction limited
to the Board, under both symmetric and asymmetric skills. (The conse-
quences for the optimal rule of extending interaction beyond the Board will
be taken up in subsequent research.)
By Theorem 3.1 in Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997) the optimal decisive
aggregation rule for our problem is defined as:
W + ln
Q
1−Q ≥ 0⇒ decision A should be taken (41)
W + ln
Q
1−Q ≤ 0⇒ decision B should be taken (42)
where W denotes the sum of votes weighted according to decisional skills:
W =
nX
i=1
xi ln
qi
1− qi
(43)
where
xi =
½
1 if i supports decision A
−1 if i supports decision B
¾
and ln
³
Q
1−Q
´
is the optimal bias towards one of the two possible alternatives.
This bias reflects the asymmetry in the priors of the two states of the world.
If we partition the Committee into two groups: group A supporting a change
in interest rates and group B supporting status quo (xi = 1 ⇒ i ∈ A and
xi = −1 ⇒ i ∈ B) then the Committee should adopt decision B only if the
following condition is met:X
i∈B
ln
qi
1− qi
≥
X
i∈A
ln
qi
1− qi
+ ln
Q
1−Q (44)
25This statement is based on public comments by the ECB President during hearings
in the European Parliament in April and December 1999.
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It follows that, if the bias is zero (i.e. if both states of the world are equally
likely) the Committee should decide to change interest rates only if more
Committee members are in favour of a change than against, where individual
votes should be weighted according to individual skills (higher skills imply
higher weight). In other words: the decision should be taken by simple
majority with weighted votes. If the optimal bias is positive (i.e. if it is
more likely that the state of the world is such that interest rates should be
changed), adopting status quo may require relatively more members to be
in favour of status quo or having relatively more skilled members voting for
status quo. Similarly, if the bias is negative, status quo may be adopted
even if a smaller number of Committee members is against the change in
comparison to the no-bias case.
Determining optimal weights, ln qi
1−qi , when there is a systematic skill
diﬀerential is complicated by the fact that the skills of individual Committee
members, qi, are unknown. We follow the logic of our setup by assuming
that Board members have diﬀerent (i.e. higher) average skills than non-
Board members. Within each of the two groups, individuals receive equal
weights. The weights are calculated for an average level of skills within each
of the groups. It can be shown that the weight calculated for the average
skill level is a good (first-order) approximation of the average weight of votes
of the members belonging to one of the groups:
Ei∈M
³
ln qi
1−qi
´
' Ei∈M
³
ln qB
1−qB +
1
qB(1−qB)(qi − qB)
´
= ln qB
1−qB (45)
Ei∈N−M
³
ln qi
1−qi
´
' Ei∈N−M
³
ln qNB
1−qNB +
1
qNB(1−qNB)(qi − qNB)
´
= ln qNB
1−qNB (46)
where i ∈M implies that i is a member of the Board and i ∈ N −M that i
is a non-Board member of the Committee. qB and qNB denote again average
skill levels among the Board and non-Board members.
If we denote by kB and kNB the number of Board and non-Board Com-
mittee members in favour of status quo, respectively, we can express the
optimal decision rule as follows:
kB ln
qB
1−qB+kNB ln
qNB
1−qNB ≥ (m− kB) ln
qB
1−qB+(n−m− kNB) ln
qNB
1−qNB+ln
Q
1−Q
(47)
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or26
α
³
kB ln
qB
1−qB + kNB ln
qNB
1−qNB
´
≥ 1
2
n+
1
2
α ln Q
1−Q (48)
α = n
m ln
qB
1−qB
+(n−m) ln qNB
1−qNB
The optimal decision rule, as formalized by (48), is to change interest rates
if the number of votes in favour of a change exceeds 1
2
n plus the bias, where
the votes of the decision-makers have to be weighted using the formula:
wi,i∈M = α ln qB1−qB (49)
wi,i∈N−M = α ln qNB1−qNB (50)
In figure 3A below we present graphically the size of the optimal bias scaled
by parameter α, i.e. the ratio of the number of Committee members (n) to
the eﬀective number of votes (m ln qB
1−qB + (n−m) ln
qNB
1−qNB ), as a function
of average decisional skills among the non-Board members, qNB. We assume
qB = 0.8 > qNB, n = {9, 19} and Q = 0.75.27
0.6
0.8
0.6 0.7q(NB)
Figure 3A: The size of the optimal bias (Q = 0.75)
Upon examining the graph we can conclude that simple majority is a
reasonable approximation to the optimal decision rule since the optimal bias
is likely to be small, especially if the number of Committee members is small
and/or their decisional skills are high. Simple majority is furthermore more
practical, since it is independent of the prior, which means the same voting
rule can be used repeatedly. Conversely, the optimal rule would be diﬀerent
as Q changes. The latter is likely to be the case over time.
26If we would approximate the optimal decision rule using the overall average of de-
cisional skills among all Committe members, q, formula (48) would read: kB + kNB ≥
1
2n+
1
2α ln
Q
1−Q , where α =
1
ln q1−q
.
27For Q = 0.25 the bias is the same in magnitude but of the opposite sign.
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